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Abstract
There are two major paradigms of white-box ad-
versarial attacks that attempt to impose input per-
turbations. The first paradigm, called the fix-
perturbation attack, crafts adversarial samples
within a given perturbation level. The second
paradigm, called the zero-confidence attack, finds
the smallest perturbation needed to cause mis-
classification, also known as the margin of an
input feature. While the former paradigm is
well-resolved, the latter is not. Existing zero-
confidence attacks either introduce significant ap-
proximation errors, or are too time-consuming.
We therefore propose MARGINATTACK, a zero-
confidence attack framework that is able to com-
pute the margin with improved accuracy and effi-
ciency. Our experiments show that MARGINAT-
TACK is able to compute a smaller margin than
the state-of-the-art zero-confidence attacks, and
matches the state-of-the-art fix-perturbation at-
tacks. In addition, it runs significantly faster than
the Carlini-Wagner attack, currently the most ac-
curate zero-confidence attack algorithm.
1. Introduction
Adversarial attack refers to the task of finding small and
imperceptible input transformations that cause a neural net-
work classifier to misclassify. White-box attacks are a subset
of attacks that have access to gradient information of the
target network. In this paper, we will focus on the white-
box attacks. An important class of input transformations
is adding small perturbations to the input. There are two
major paradigms of adversarial attacks that attempt to im-
pose input perturbations. The first paradigm, called the fix-
perturbation attack, tries to find perturbations that are most
likely to cause misclassification, with the constraint that the
norm of the perturbations cannot exceed a given level. Since
*Equal contribution 1MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab, Cambridge,
MA, USA 2IBM Research, USA 3University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign, Illinois, USA. Correspondence to: Yang Zhang
<yang.zhang2@ibm.com>.
Preliminary work. Under review.
the perturbation level is fixed, fix-perturbation attacks may
fail to find any adversarial samples for inputs that are far
away from the decision boundary. The second paradigm,
called the zero-confidence attack, tries to find the smallest
perturbations that are guaranteed to cause misclassification,
regardless of how large the perturbations are. Since they
aim to minimize the perturbation norm, zero-confidence at-
tacks usually find adversarial samples that ride right on the
decision boundaries, and hence the name “zero-confidence”.
The resulting perturbation norm is also known as the mar-
gin of an input feature to the decision boundary. Both of
these paradigms are essentially constrained optimization
problems. The former has a simple convex constraint (per-
turbation norm), but a non-convex target (classification loss
or logit differences). In contrast, the latter has a non-convex
constraint (classification loss or logit differences), but a sim-
ple convex target (perturbation norm). Fig. 1 illustrates the
two attack paradigms.
Despite their similarity as optimization problems, the two
paradigms differ significantly in terms of difficulty. The
fix-perturbation attack problem is easier. The state-of-the-
art algorithms, including projected gradient descent (PGD)
(Madry et al., 2017) and distributional adversarial attack
(Zheng et al., 2018), can achieve both high efficiency and
high success rate, and often come with theoretical conver-
gence guarantee. On the other hand, the zero-confidence
attack problem is much more challenging. Existing meth-
ods are either not strong enough or too slow. For example,
DeepFool (Moosavi Dezfooli et al., 2016) and fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin
et al., 2016a;b) linearizes the constraint, and solves the sim-
plified optimization problem with a simple convex target
and a linear constraint. However, due to the linearization
approximation errors, the solution can be far from optimal.
As another extreme, L-BFGS (Szegedy et al., 2013) and
Carlini-Wagner (CW) (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) convert
the optimization problem into a Lagrangian, and the La-
grangian multiplier is determined through grid search or
binary search. These attacks are generally much stronger
and theoretically grounded, but can be very slow.
The necessity of developing a better zero-confidence at-
tack is evident. The zero-confidence attack paradigm is a
more realistic attack setting. More importantly, it aims to
measure the margin of each individual token, which lends
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Figure 1. Illutration of zero-confidence attack and fix-perturbation attack. The black curve denotes the decision boundary. The red dot
denote the original features, and the green dots denote the adversarial examples. Zero-confidence attacks find the closest point on the
decision boundary. Fix-perturbation attacks find the example that are most likely to cause a misclassification within a given perturbation
level.
more insight into the data distribution and adversarial ro-
bustness. Motivated by this, we propose MARGINATTACK,
a zero-confidence attack framework that is able to com-
pute the margin with improved accuracy and efficiency.
Specifically, MARGINATTACK iterates between two moves.
The first move, called restoration move, linearizes the con-
straint and solves the simplified optimization problem, just
like DeepFool and FGSM; the second move, called pro-
jection move, explores even smaller perturbations without
changing the constraint values significantly. By construc-
tion, MARGINATTACK inherits the efficiency in DeepFool
and FGSM, and improves over them in terms of accuracy
with a convergence guarantee. Our experiments show that
MARGINATTACK attack is able to compute a smaller mar-
gin than the state-of-the-art zero-confidence attacks, and
matches the state-of-the-art fix-perturbation attacks. In addi-
tion, it runs significantly faster than CW, and in some cases
comparable to DeepFool and FGSM.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 goes over some related works. Section 3 details the
MARGINATTACK algorithm and presents its convergence
guarantee. Section 4 evaluates the accuracy and efficiency of
MARGINATTACK and compare it against the existing state-
of-the-art adversarial attack algorithms. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. Related Works
In addition to the aforementioned state-of-the-art attacks,
there are a couple of other works that attempt to explore the
margin. Jacobian-based saliency map attack (Papernot et al.,
2016) applies gradient information to guide the crafting of
adversarial examples. It chooses to perturb the input fea-
tures whose gradient is consistent with the adversarial goal.
One-pixel attack (Su et al., 2017) finds adversarial examples
by perturbing only one pixel, which can be regarded as find-
ing the `0 margin of the inputs. Ilyas et al. (2018) converts
PGD into a zero-confidence attack by searching different
perturbation levels, but this again can be time-consuming
because it needs to solve multiple optimization subprob-
lems. Weng et al. proposed a metric called CLEVER (Weng
et al., 2018), which estimates an upper-bound of the margins.
Unfortunately, recent work (Goodfellow, 2018) has shown
that CLEVER can overestimate the margins due to gradient
masking (Papernot et al., 2017). Boundary attack (Brendel
et al., 2017) is a black-box attack that crawl along the deci-
sion boundary to find the optimal solution, which shares a
similar idea with MARGINATTACK. The major difference
is that boundary attack use a Monte-Carlo approach to ex-
plore the search direction, but MARGINATTACK follows a
calculated search direction, which is more efficient. The
above are a just a small subset of attack algorithms that are
relevant to our work. For an overview of the field, we refer
readers to Akhtar & Mian (2018).
The MARGINATTACK framework is inspired by the Rosen’s
algorithm (Rosen, 1961) for constraint optimization prob-
lems. However, there are several important distinctions.
First, the Rosen’s algorithm rests on some unrealistic as-
sumptions for neural networks, e.g. continuously differ-
entiable constraints, while MARGINATTACK has a conver-
gence guarantee with a more realistic set of assumptions.
Second, the Rosen’s algorithm requires a step size search
for each iteration, which can be time-consuming, whereas
MARGINATTACK will work with a simple diminishing step
size scheme. Most importantly, as will be shown later,
MARGINATTACK refers to a large class of attack algorithms
depending on how the two parameters, a(k) and b(k), are set,
and the Rosen’s algorithm only fits into one of the settings,
which only works well under the `2 norm. For other norms,
there exist other parameter settings that are much more ef-
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fective. As another highlight, the convergence guarantee of
MARGINATTACK holds for all the settings that satisfy some
moderate assumptions.
3. The MARGINATTACK Algorithm
In this section, we will formally introduce the algorithm and
discuss its convergence properties. In the paper, we will
denote scalars with non-bolded letters, e.g. a or A; column
vectors with lower-cased, bolded letters, e.g. a; matrix with
upper-cased, bolded letters, e.g. A; sets with upper-cased
double-stoke letters, e.g. A; gradient of a function f(x)
evaluated at x = x0 as∇f(x0).
3.1. Problem Formulation
Given a classifier whose output logits are denoted as
l0(x), l1(x), · · · , lC−1(x), where C is the total number
of classes, for any data token (x0, t), where x0 is an n-
dimensional input feature vector, and t ∈ {0, · · · , C − 1}
is its label, MARGINATTACK computes
x∗ = argmin
x
d(x− x0), s.t. c(x) ≤ 0, (1)
where d(·) is a norm. In this paper we only consider `2 and
`∞ norms, but the proposed method is generalizable to other
norms. For non-targeted adversarial attacks, the constraint
is defined as
c(x) = lt(x)−max
i 6=t
li(x)− ε, (2)
where ε is the offset parameter. As a common practice, ε
is often set to a small negative number to ensure that the
adversarial sample lies on the incorrect side of the decision
boundary. In this paper, we will only consider non-targeted
attack, but all the discussions are applicable to targeted
attacks (i.e. c(x) = maxi 6=a li(x)− la(x)− ε for a target
class a).
3.2. The MARGINATTACK Procedure
MARGINATTACK alternately performs the restoration move
and the projection move. Specifically, denote the solution
after the k-th iteration as x(k). Then the two steps are:
Restoration Move: The restoration move tries to hop to the
constraint boundary, i.e. c(x) = 0 with the shortest hop.
Formally, it solves:
z(k) = argmin
x
d(x− x(k)),
s.t. ∇T c(x(k))(x− x(k)) = −α(k)c(x(k)).
(3)
where α(k) is the step size within [0, 1]. Notice that the left
hand side of the constraint in Eq. (3) is the first-order Taylor
approximation of c(z(k))− c(x(k)), so this constraint tries
to move point closer to c(x) = 0 by α(k). It can be shown,
from the dual-norm theory,1 that the solution to (3) is
z(k) = x(k) − α
(k)c(x(k))s(x(k))
∇T c(x(k))s(x(k)) . (4)
s(x) is defined such that ∇T c(x)s(x) = d∗(∇T c(x)),
where d∗(·) is the dual norm of d(·). Specifically, notic-
ing that the dual norm of the `p norm is the `(1−p−1)−1
norm, we have
s(x) =
{ ∇c(x)/‖∇c(x)‖2 if d(·) is the `2 norm
sign(∇c(x)) if d(·) is the `∞ norm.
(5)
As mentioned, Eq. (4) is similar to DeepFool under `2 norm,
and to FGSM under `∞ norm. Therefore, we can expect
that the restoration move should effectively hop towards the
decision boundary, but the hop direction may not be optimal.
That is why we need the next move.
Projection Move: The projection move tries to move closer
to x0 while ensuring that c(x) will not change drastically.
Formally,
x(k+1) = z(k)−β(k)a(k)∇d(z(k)−x0)−β(k)b(k)s(z(k))
(6)
where β(k) is the step size within [0, 1]; a(k) and b(k) are
two scalars, which will be specified later. As an intuitive
explanation on Eq. (6), notice that the second term, which
we will call the distance reduction term, reduces the dis-
tance to x0, whereas the third term, which we will call the
constraint reduction term, reduces the the constraint (be-
cause s(z(k)) and ∇c(z(k)) has a positive inner product).
Therefore, the projection move essentially strikes a balance
between reduction in distance and reduction in constraint.
a(k) and b(k) can have two designs. The first design is to
ensure the constraint values are roughly the same after the
move, i.e. c(z(k))− c(x(k+1)) ≈ 0. By Taylor approxima-
tion, we have
∇T c(z(k))(x(k+1) − z(k)) = 0, (7)
whose solution is
b(k) =
a(k)∇T c(z(k))∇d(z(k) − x0)
∇T c(z(k))s(z(k)) . (8)
Another design is to ensure the perturbation norm reduces
roughly by β(k), i.e.
d(x(k+1) − x0) ≈ (1− β(k))d(z(k) − x0).
By Taylor approximation, we have
∇T d(z(k)−x0)(x(k+1)−z(k)) = β(k)d(z(k)−x0), (9)
1See Thm. 2 in the appendix for a detailed proof.
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Figure 2. A convergence path of MARGINATTACK using `2 norm
as an example. The thick black curve depicts the decision boundary.
The grey curves denote the contours of the constraint function.
The red dots on the right denote the original input feature and the
optimal zero-confident adversarial example. Double arrows denote
the direction of the restoration moves. Single arrows denote the
direction of projection moves.
whose solution is
a(k) = 1− b
(k)∇T d(z(k) − x0)s(z(k))
∇T d(z(k) − x0)∇d(z(k) − x0) . (10)
It should be noted that Eqs. (8) and (10) are just two specific
choices for a(k) and b(k). It turns out that MARGINATTACK
will work with a convergence guarantee for a wide range of
bounded a(k)s and b(k)s that satisfy some conditions, as will
be shown in section 3.4. Therefore, MARGINATTACK pro-
vides a general and flexible framework for zero-confidence
adversarial attack designs. In practice, we find that Eq. (8)
works better for `2 norm, and Eq. (10) works better for `∞.
3.3. How MARGINATTACK Works
Figure 2 illustrates a typical convergence path of
MARGINATTACK using `2 norm and Eq. (8) as an example.
The red dots on the right denote the original inputs x0 and
its closest point on the decision boundary, x∗. Suppose after
iteration k, MARGINATTACK reaches x(k), denoted by the
green dot on the left. The restoration move travels directly
towards the decision boundary by finding the normal direc-
tion to the current constraint contour. Then, the projection
move travels along the tangent plane of the current con-
straint contour to reduce the distance to x0 while preventing
the constraint value from deviating much. As intuitively ex-
pected, the iteration should eventually approach x∗. Figure
3 plots an empirical convergence curve of the perturbation
norm and constraint value of MARGINATTACK-`2 on a ran-
domly chosen CIFAR image. Each move from a triangle to
a circle dot is a restoration move, and from circle to triangle
a projection move. The red line is the smoothed version. As
can be seen, a restoration move reduces the constraint value
while slightly increasing the constraint norm, and a pro-
jection move reduces the perturbation norm while slightly
affecting the constraint value. Both curves can converge.
3.4. The Convergence Guarantee
The constraint function c(x) in Eq. (2) is nonconvex, thus
the convergence analysis for MARGINATTACK is limited
to the vicinity of a unique local optimum, as stated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. Denote x∗ as one local optimum for Eq. (1).
Assume∇c(x∗) exists. Define projection matrices
P = I − s(x∗)(∇T c(x∗)s(x∗))−1∇T c(x∗). (11)
Consider the neighborhood
B = {x : ‖P [x− x∗]‖22 ≤ X, |c(x)| ≤ C}, (12)
that satisfies the following assumptions:
1. (Differentiability) ∀x ∈ B, ∇c(x) exists, but can be
discontinuous, i.e. all the discontinuity points of the
gradient in B are jump discontinuities;
2. (Lipschitz Continuity at x∗) ∀x ∈ B,
‖s(x)− s(x∗)‖2 ≤ Ls‖s(x∗)‖2‖x− x∗‖2;
3. (Bounded Gradient Norm) ∀x ∈ B,
0 < m ≤ ‖∇c(x)‖2 ≤M ;
4. (Bounded Gradient Difference) ∃δ > 0, ∀x,y ∈ B s.t.
y − x = ls(x) for some l,
∇T c(y)s(x) ≥ δ∇T c(x)s(x);
5. (Constraint Convexity) ∃γ ∈ (0, 1), ∀x ∈ B,
(a(k)∇d(x− x0) + b(k)s(x))TP TP (x− x0)
≥ γ(x− x0)TP TP (x− x0);
6. (Unique Optimality) x∗ is the only global optimum
within B;
7. (Constant Bounded Restoration Step Size) α(k) = α <
Mα;2
8. (Shrinking Projected Step Size) β(k) < β/(k + k0)ν ,
where 0 < ν < 1 and β ≤ Mβ , k0 > mk;3 |a(k)| <
Ma, |b(k)| < Mb;
9. (Presence in Neighborhood) ∃K, x(K) ∈ int[B], i.e.
the interior of B.
2See Eq. (21) for the definition of Mα in the appendix.
3See Eqs. (52) and (22) for the definitions of Mβ and mk in
the appendix.
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Figure 3. An empirical convergence curve of perturbation norm (left) and constraint value (right). The grey curves are the true convergence
curve. The red curves are smoothes values to show the general convergence trend. A restoration move travels from a triangle to a circle. A
projection move travels from a circle to a triangle.
Then we have the convergence guarantee limk→∞‖x(k) −
x∗‖2 = 0.
The proof will be presented in the appendix. Here are a few
remarks. First, assumption 1 allows jump discontinuities
in ∇c(x) almost everywhere, which is a very practical as-
sumption for deep neural networks. Most neural network
operations, such as ReLU and max-pooling, as well as the
max operation in Eq. (2), introduce nothing beyond jump
discontinuities in gradient.
Second, assumption 3 does require the constraint gradi-
ent to be lower bounded, which may lead to concerns that
MARGINATTACK may fail in the presence of gradient mask-
ing (Papernot et al., 2017). However, notice that the gradient
boundedness assumption is only imposed in B, which is
in the vicinity of the decision boundary, whereas gradient
masking is most likely to appear away from the decision
boundary and where the input features are populated. Be-
sides, as will be discussed later, a random initialization as
in PGD will be adopted to bypass regions with gradient
masking. Experiments on adversarially trained models also
verify the robustness of MARGINATTACK.
Finally, assumption 5 does not actually stiple that the deci-
sion boundary is convex. It only stipulates that c(x) is con-
vex or “not too concave” in B (and thus so is the constraint
set c(x) ≤ 0), so that the first order optimality condition can
readily imply local minimum instead of a local maximum.
In fact, it can be shown that assumption 5 can be implied if
c(x) is convex in B.4 Fig. 4 displays some example decision
boundaries permitted by Thm. 1.
3.5. Additional Implementation Details
There are a few additional implementation details as out-
lined below.
4See Thm. 3 in the appendix.
Box Constraint: In many applications, each dimension of
the input features should be bounded, i.e. x ∈ [xmin, xmax]n.
To impose the box constraint, the restoration move problem
as in Eq. (3) is modified as
z(k) = argmin
x∈[xmin,xmax]n
d(x− x(k))
s.t. ∇T c(x(k))(x− x(k)) = −α(k)c(x(k)),
(13)
whose solution is
z(k) = Proj[xmin,xmax]n{z˜(k)}, (14)
where
z˜(k) =
x(k) − α
(k)c(x(k)) +
∑
i∈IC ∇ic(x(k))(z(k)i − x(k)i )∑
i∈I∇ic(x(k))si(x(k))
s(x(k)).
(15)
Proj(·) is an operator that projects the vector in its argument
onto the subset in its subscript. I is a set of indices with
which the elements in z˜(k) satisfy the box constraint, and
IC is its complement. I is determined by running Eq. (14)
iteratively and updating I after each iterations.
Unlike other attack algorithms that simply project the solu-
tion onto the constraint box, MARGINATTACK incorporates
the box constraint in a principled way, such that any local op-
timal solution x∗ will be an invariant point of the restoration
move. Thus the convergence is faster.
Target Scan: According to Eq. (2), each restoration move
essentially approaches the adversarial class with the highest
logit, but the class with the highest logit may not be the clos-
est. To mitigate the problem, we follow a similar approach
adopted in DeepFool, which we call target scan. Target
scan performs a target-specific restoration move towards
each class, and chooses the move with the shortest distance.
Formally, target scan introduces a set of target-specific con-
straints {ci(x) = lt(x) − li(x) − ε}. A restoration move
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Figure 4. An illustration of the convexity assumption in Thm. 1, using `2 norm as an example. The red dot denotes the input sample to
be attacked. The blank line denotes the decision boundary. The green dot denotes the tangent point between the `2 ball centered at the
input sample and the decision boundary. The left four cases are permitted by Thm. 1 and the rightmost case is prohibited. The convexity
assumption in fact permits a wide range of different boundary shape, even if the constraint set is concave, as long as it does not bend more
than the `2 ball does.
with target scan solves
z(k) = argmin
i∈A
d(z(k,i) − x0), (16)
where z(k,i) is the solution to Eqs. (3) or (13) with c(x(k))
replaced with ci(x(k)), and thus is equal to Eqs. (4) or (14)
with c(x(k)) replaced with ci(x(k)). A is a set of candidate
adversarial calsses, which can be all the incorrect classes
if the number of classes is small, or which can be a subset
of the adversarial classes with the highest logits otherwise.
Experiments show that target scan is necessary only in the
first few restoration moves, when the closest and highest
adversarial classes are likely to be distinct. Therefore, the
computation cost will not increase too much.
Initialization: The initialization of x(0) can be either deter-
ministic or random as follows
x(0) = x0 (Deterministic),
x(0) = x0 + u, u ∼ U{[−u, u]n} (Random),
(17)
where U{[−u, u]n} denotes the uniform random distribu-
tion in [−u, u]n. Similar to PGD, we can perform multiple
trials with random initialization to find a better local opti-
mum.
Final Tuning MARGINATTACK can only cause misclassi-
fication when c(x) ≤ ε. To make sure the attack is suc-
cessful, the final iterations of MARGINATTACK consists
of restoration moves only, and no projection moves, until
a misclassification is caused. This can also ensure the fi-
nal solution satisfies the box constraint (because only the
restoration move incorporates the box constraint).
Summary: Alg. 1 summarizes the MARGINATTACK pro-
cedure. As for the complexity, each restoration move or
projection move requires only one backward propagation,
and thus the computational complexity of each move is
comparable to one iteration of most attack algorithms.
4. Experiments
This section compares MARGINATTACK with several state-
of-the-art adversarial attack algorithms in terms of the pertur-
bation norm and computation time on image classification
benchmarks.
4.1. Attacking Regular Models
4.1.1. CONFIGURATIONS
Three regularly trained models are evaluated on.
• MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998): The classifier is a stack
of two 5× 5 convolutional layers with 32 and 64 filters
respectively, followed by two fully-connected layers with
1,024 hidden units.
• CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009): The classifier
is a pre-trained ResNet32 (He et al., 2016) provided by
TensorFlow.5.
• ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015): The classifier is
a pre-trained ResNet50 (He et al., 2016) provided by
TensorFlow Keras6. Evaluation is on a validation subset
containing 10,000 images.
The range of each pixel is [0, 1] for MNIST, and [0, 255] for
CIFAR10 and ImageNet. The settings of MARGINATTACK
and baselines are listed below. Unless stated otherwise, the
baseline algorithms are implemented by cleverhans (Nico-
las Papernot, 2017). The hyperparameters are set to defaults
if not specifically stated.
• CW (Carlini & Wagner, 2017): The target and evaluation
norm is `2. The learning rate is set to 0.05 for MNIST,
0.001 for CIFAR10 and 0.01 for ImageNet, which are
5https://github.com/tensorflow/models/
tree/master/official
6https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/
python/tf/keras/applications/ResNet50
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Algorithm 1 MARGINATTACK Procedure
Input: A set of logit functions l0:C−1(x);
an input feature x0 and its label t;
Output: A solution x˜∗ to Eq. (1)
Initialize x(0) according to Eq. (17)
for k < number of iterations do
if k < number of target scan iterations then
Do target scan restoration move as in Eq. (16)
else
Do regular restoration move as in Eqs. (3) or (13)
end if
if k < final tuning iteration then
Do projection move as in Eqs. (6)
else
Skip projection move: x(k+1) = z(k)
end if
end for
tuned to its best performance. Since CW attack has a
accuracy-efficiency tradeoff controlled by the number of
binary search steps, we implemented three versions of
CW, called CW Bin 3, CW Bin 5 and CW Bin10, where
number of binary steps for multiplier search is set to 3, 5
and 10 respectively. For ImageNet, due to running time
constraints, only CW Bin5 is implemented.
• DeepFool (Moosavi Dezfooli et al., 2016): The evalua-
tion norm is `2.
• FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014): FGSM is implemented
by authors. The step size is searched to achieve zero-
confidence attack. The evaluation distance metric is `∞.
• PGD (Madry et al., 2017): The target and evaluation
norm are `∞. The learning rate is set to 0.01 for MNIST,
and 0.05 for CIFAR10 and 0.1 for ImageNet.
• MARGINATTACK: Two versions of MARGINATTACK
are implemented, whose target and evaluation norms are
`2, and `∞, respectively. The hyperparmeters are de-
tailed in Table 5 in the appendix. The first 10 restoration
moves are with target scan, and the last 20 moves are all
restoration moves.
The number of iterations/moves is set to 2,000 for CW,
200 with 10 random starts for PGD and MARGINATTACK
(except for ImageNet where there is only one random run),
and 200 for the rest.
4.1.2. RESULTS AND ANALYSES
For each dataset, we choose four perturbation levels and
compute the success rate of the attacks. The perturbation
levels are chosen to roughly follow the 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8
quantiles of the MARGINATTACK margins. Table 1 com-
pares the success rates under the chosen quantiles among
the `2 attacks, and Table 2 comapres among the `∞ at-
tacks. Among the `2 attacks, we have two observations.
First, the DeepFool performs the worst among all the al-
gorithms, which is reasonable because DeepFool attempts
to achieve high efficiency at the cost of accuracy. Second,
for CW attack, we can see a clear efficiency-accuracy trade-
off. As the number of binary search steps increases, the
accuracy increases. However, even with 10 binary search
steps, where the computation load is already very high, its at-
tack success rate is still outperformed by MARGINATTACK.
MARGINATTACK maintains a 3% advantage on MNIST, 1%
on CIFAR10 and 3% on ImageNet.
Among the `∞ attacks, we also have two observations.
First, similar to the case of DeepFool, FGSM has a sig-
nificantly lower attack success rate. Second, we can see that
MARGINATTACK outperforms PGD, which is currently the
state-of-the-art `∞ attack, under all the perturbation levels.
4.2. Attacking Adversarially Trained Model
We also evaluate MARGINATTACK on the MNIST Adversar-
ial Examples Challenge7, which is a challenge of attacking
an MNIST model adversarially trained using PGD with
0.3 perturbation level. Same as the PGD baseline listed,
MARGINATTACK is run with 50 random starts, and the
initialization perturbation range u = 0.3. The number of
moves is 500. The target norm is `∞. bn = 5 and an is set
as in Eq. (10). The rest of the configuration is the same as
in the previous experiments.
Table 3 lists the success rates of different attacks under
0.3 perturbation level. The baseline algorithms are all fix-
perturbation attacks, and their results are excerpted from
the challenge white-box attack leaderboard. As can be
seen, MARGINATTACK, as the only zero-confidence at-
tack algorithm, has the second best result, which shows
that it performs competitively against the state-of-the-art
fix-perturbation attacks.
4.3. Convergence
We would like to revisit the convergence plot of the con-
straint value c(x) and perturbation norm d(x) of as in
Fig. 3. We can see that MARGINATTACK converges very
quickly. In the example shown in the figure, it is able to con-
verge within 20 moves. Therefore, MARGINATTACK can
be greatly accelerated by cutting the number of iterations to,
e.g. 15, and still produces a decent attack. This result shows
greater insight into the efficiency of MARGINATTACK. If
margin accuracy is the priority, a large number of moves,
7https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_
challenge
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Table 1. Success rate (%) of `2 adversarial attacks under given perturbation norms.
Algorithm MNIST CIFAR IMAGENET
1.00 / 1.41 / 1.73 / 2 8 / 15 / 25 / 40 10 / 32 / 50 / 80
DeepFool 17.4 / 44.9 / 69.9 / 84.7 19.4 / 34.5 / 52.6 / 73.3 38.7 / 55.1 / 66.3 / 79.8
CW Bin3 24.6 / 62.7 / 85.7 / 95.3 23.9 / 45.2 / 71.6 / 91.5 N/A
CW Bin5 24.8 / 63.1 / 85.9 / 95.4 24.0 / 45.4 / 71.7 / 91.8 40.4 / 58.7 / 71.0 / 85.6
CW Bin10 24.9 / 63.2 / 86.0 / 95.4 24.0 / 45.6 / 71.8 / 92.1 N/A
MARGINATTACK-`2 25.7 / 66.3 / 88.4 / 97.1 24.3 / 46.3 / 73.9 / 93.3 40.4 / 60.6 / 74.9 / 89.4
Table 2. Success rate (%) of `∞ adversarial attacks under given perturbation norms.
Algorithm MNIST CIFAR IMAGENET
0.06 / 0.08 / 0.10 / 0.12 0.2 / 0.4 / 0.6 / 1 0.05 / 0.1 / 0.2 / 0.4
FGSM 7.55 / 13.9 / 24.9 / 35.4 18.5 / 31.0 / 41.1 / 54.7 39.8 / 47.2 / 60.1 / 75.3
PGD 17.1 / 42.2 / 73.7 / 91.8 18.9 / 38.9 / 59.1 / 84.1 40.4 / 49.8 / 68.8 / 90.6
MARGINATTACK-`∞ 18.1 / 43.0 / 74.1 / 92.1 21.1 / 42.2 / 62.6 / 87.3 41.5 / 51.3 / 69.0 / 90.8
Table 3. Success rate under 0.3 perturbation norm of the MNIST
Adversarial Examples Challenge.
Algorithm Success Rate (%)
Zheng et al. (2018) 11.21
MARGINATTACK (`∞) 11.16
1st-Order on Logit Diff 11.15
PGD on Cross-Entropy Loss 10.38
PGD on CW Loss 10.29
Table 4. Running time comparison (in seconds) on a single batch
of images.
Algorithm MNIST CIFAR IMAGENET
CW Bin3 5.77 100.10 N/A
CW Bin5 8.99 168.88 872.28
CW Bin10 16.02 350.10 N/A
MARGINATTACK-`2 3.01 51.03 248.82
DeepFool 1.14 21.26 44.41
PGD 0.87 33.17 46.3
FSGM 0.11 0.95 10.05
e.g. 200 as in our experiment, would help. However, if
efficiency is the priority, a small number of moves, e.g. 30,
suffices to produce a decent attack, which further improves
MARGINATTACK’s efficiency.
To further assess the efficiency of MARGINATTACK, Tab. 4
compares the running time (in seconds) of attacking one
batch of images, implemented on a single NVIDIA TESLA
P100 GPU. The batch size is 200 for MNIST and CIFAR10,
and 100 for ImageNet. The settings are the same as stated
in section 4.1, except that for a better comparison, the num-
ber of iterations of CW is cut down to 200, and PGD and
MARGINATTACK runs one random pass, so that all the
algorithms have the same iteration/moves. Only the `2 ver-
sions of MARGINATTACK are shown because the other
versions have similar run times. As shown, running time
of MARGINATTACK is much shorter than CW even with
3 binary search steps, and is comparable to DeepFool and
PGD. CW is significantly slower that the other algorithms
because it has to run multiple trials to search for the best
Lagrange multiplier. Note that DeepFool and CW enable
early stop, but MARGINATTACK does not. Considering
MARGINATTACK’s fast convergence rate, the running time
can be further reduced by early stop, which leads to a very
efficient attack algorithm.
It is also worthwhile to mention that PGD is the only fix-
perturbation attack algorithm and the listed running time
only involves running one pass of of the attack algorithm.
If one wants to measure the margin of a particular input
example, multiple passes of PGD is needed, whereas all the
zero-confidence attacks still only need to run once.
5. Conclusion
We have proposed MARGINATTACK, a novel zero-
confidence adversarial attack algorithm that is better able
to find a smaller perturbation that results in misclassifica-
tion. Both theoretical and empirical analyses have demon-
strated that MARGINATTACK is an efficient, reliable and
accurate adversarial attack algorithm, and establishes a new
state-of-the-art among zero-confidence attacks. What is
more, MARGINATTACK still has room for improvement.
So far, only two settings of a(k) and b(k) are developed,
but MARGINATTACK will work for many other settings, as
long as assumption 5 is satisfied. Authors hereby encour-
age exploring novel and better settings for the MARGINAT-
TACK framework, and promote MARGINATTACK as a new
robustness evaluation measure or baseline in the field of
adversarial attack and defense.
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Appendix
A. Proving Thm. 1
This supplementary material aims to prove Thm. 1. Without the loss of generality, K in Eq. (9) in set to 0. Before we prove
the theorem, we need to introduce some lemmas.
Lemma 1.1. If assumption 3 in Thm. 1 holds, then ∀x ∈ B
∇T c(x)s(x)
‖s(x)‖2 ≥
m√
n
(18)
Proof. According to Eq. (5), for `2 norm,
∇T c(x)s(x)
‖s(x)‖2 = ‖∇c(x)‖2 ≥ m >
m√
n
(19)
for `∞ norm,
∇T c(x)s(x)
‖s(x)‖2 =
‖∇c(x)‖1
‖s(x)‖2 ≥
‖∇c(x)‖2√
n
≥ m√
n
(20)
Lemma 1.2. Given all the assumptions in Thm. 1, where
Mα = min
{
1, sup x,y∈B:
∃l,y−x=ls(x)
∇T c(y)s(x)
∇T c(x)s(x) ,
mγ
2nLsκ
}
(21)
mk =
(
A−1/2ν − 1
)−1
(22)
and assuming x(k), z(k) ∈ B,∀k, then we have
|c(x(k))| ≤ κβ(k) (23)
where
κ = max
{
B√
A(1−√A) ,
c(x(0))
β(0)
}
(24)
A and B are defined in Eq. (34).
According to assumption 8, this implies
lim
k→∞
|c(x(k))| = 0 (25)
at the rate of at least 1/nν .
Proof. As a digression, the second term in Eq. (21) is well defined, because
∇T c(y)s(x)
∇T c(x)s(x)
is upper bounded by Lem. 1.1 and assumptions 3.
Back to proving the lemma, we will prove that each restoration move will bring c(x(k)) closer to 0, while each projection
move will not change c(x(k)) much.
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First, for the restoration move
|c(z(k))| ≤ |c(x(k)) +∇T c(ξ)(z(k) − x(k))|
=
∣∣∣∣c(x(k))− α(k)∇T c(ξ) c(x(k))s(x(k))∇T c(x(k))s(x(k))
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣1− α ∇T c(ξ)s(x(k))∇T c(x(k))s(x(k))
∣∣∣∣ |c(x(k))|
≤ (1− αδ)|c(x(k))|
(26)
The first line is from the generalization of Mean-Value Theorem with jump discontinuities, and ξ = tz(k) + (1− t)x(k) and
t is a real number in [0, 1]. The second line is from Eq. (4). The last line is from assumptions 4 and 7 and Eq. (21).
Next, for the projection move
|c(x(k+1))| ≤ |c(z(k))|+M‖x(k+1) − z(k)‖2
= |c(z(k))|+ β(k)M‖a(k)∇d(z(k) − x0) + b(k)s(z(k))‖2
≤ |c(z(k))|+ β(k)M
(
a(k)‖∇d(z(k) − x0)‖2 + b(k)‖s(z(k))‖2
) (27)
The first line is from the fact that assumption 3 implies that c(x) is M -Lipschitz continuous.
Both ‖∇d(z(k) − x0)‖2 and ‖s(z(k))‖2 is upper-bounded, i.e.
‖∇d(z(k) − x0)‖2 < Md, ‖s(z(k))‖2 < Ms (28)
for some Md and Ms. To see this, for `2 norm
‖∇d(z(k) − x0)‖2 = 2‖z(k) − x0‖2 ≤ 2b, ‖s(z(k))‖2 = 1 (29)
where b is defined as the maximum perturbation norm (`2) within B, i.e.
b = max
x∈B
‖x0 − x‖2 (30)
which is well defined because B is a tight set. For `∞ norm,
‖∇d(z(k) − x0)‖2 ≤
√
n, ‖s(z(k))‖2 ≤
√
n (31)
Note that Eq. (28) also holds for other norms. With Eq. (28) and assumption 8, Eq. (27) becomes
|c(x(k+1))| ≤ |c(z(k))|+ β(k)M (MaMd +MbMs) (32)
Combining Eqs. (26) and (32) we have
|c(x(k+1))| ≤ A|c(x(k))|+ β(k)B (33)
where
A = 1− αδ
B =M (MaMd +MbMs)
(34)
According to assumption 7, 0 < A < 1. Also, according to Eq. (22), β(k)/β(k+1) ≤ A−1/2,∀k,
Divide Eq (33) by β(k), we have
|c(x(k+1))|
β(k+1)
≤ |c(x
(k+1))|√
Aβ(k)
≤
√
A
|c(x(k))|
β(k)
+
B√
A
(35)
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and thus
|c(x(k+1))|
β(k+1)
− B√
A(1−√A) ≤
√
A
( |c(x(k))|
β(k)
− B√
A(1−√A)
)
(36)
If
|c(x(0))|
β(0)
− B√
A(1−√A) ≤ 0
Then Eq. (36) implies
|c(x(k))|
β(k)
− B√
A(1−√A) ≤ 0,∀k (37)
Otherwise, Eq. (36) implies
|c(x(k))|
β(k)
− B√
A(1−√A) ≤
|c(x(0))|
β(0)
− B√
A(1−√A) ,∀k (38)
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 1.3. Given all the assumptions in Thm. 1, and assuming x(k), z(k) ∈ B,∀k, we have
lim
k→∞
‖P (x(k) − x0)‖22 = 0 (39)
Proof. First, for restoration move
‖P [z(k) − x0]‖22
= ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 + 2[z(k) − x0]TP TP [z(k) − x(k)]− ‖P [z(k) − x(k)]‖22
≤ ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 + 2‖P [z(k) − x0]‖2‖P [z(k) − x(k)]‖2
= ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 + 2α‖P [z(k) − x0]‖2
∥∥∥∥ c(x(k))∇T c(x(k))s(x(k))Ps(x(k))
∥∥∥∥
2
= ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 + 2α‖P [z(k) − x0]‖2
∥∥∥∥ c(x(k))∇T c(x(k))s(x(k))P [s(x(k))− s(x∗)]
∥∥∥∥
2
= ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 + 2α‖P [z(k) − x0]‖2
∥∥∥∥c(x(k))∇T c(x∗)(s(x(k))− s(x∗))∇T c(x(k))s(x(k))∇T c(x∗)s(x∗) s(x∗)
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 +
2αn|c(x(k))|
m
‖P [z(k) − x0]‖2 ‖s(x
(k))− s(x∗)‖2
‖s(x(k))‖2
≤ ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 +
2αnLsκβ
(k)
m
‖P [z(k) − x0]‖2‖x(k) − x∗‖2
≤ ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 +
2αnLsκβ
(k)
m
‖P [z(k) − x0]‖2
[
‖P [x(k) − x0]‖2 + c(x
(k)) +M‖P [x(k) − x0]‖2
δm/
√
n
]
≤ ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 +
2αnLsκβ
(k)(m+M
√
n)
δm2
‖P [z(k) − x0]‖2‖P [x(k) − x0]‖2 + 2α
√
nLsκ
2β(k)2
δm2
(40)
Line 4 is given by Eq. (3). Line 5 is derived from Lem. 1.1. The last line is from Lem. 1.2.
Eq. (40) implies
(‖P [z(k) − x0]‖2 − r(k)1 ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖2)(‖P [z(k) − x0]‖2 − r(k)2 ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖2) ≤
2α
√
nLsκ
2β(k)2
δm2
(41)
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where
r
(k)
1 =
1
2
2αnLsκβ(k)
m
−
√(
2αnLsκβ(k)
m
)2
+ 4
 < 0
r
(k)
2 =
1
2
2αnLsκβ(k)
m
+
√(
2αnLsκβ(k)
m
)2
+ 4
 > 0
(42)
It can easily be shown that
−r(k)1
r
(k)
2
=
r
(k)2
1
−r(k)1 r(k)2
=
r
(k)2
1
4
≥ r
(0)2
1
4
(43)
Therefore
‖P [z(k) − x0]‖2 − r(k)1 ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖2 ≥
r
(0)2
1
4
(‖P [z(k) − x0]‖2 + r(k)2 ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖2) (44)
Combining Eqs. (41) and (44), we have
‖P [z(k) − x0]‖22 ≤ r(k)22 ‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 +
8α
√
nLsκ
2β(k)2
δm2r
(0)2
1
<
(
1 +
2αnLsκβ
(k)
m
)2
‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 +
8α
√
nLsκ
2β(k)2
δm2r
(0)2
1
(45)
Next, for projection move
‖P [x(k+1) − x0]‖22
= ‖P [z(k) − x0]‖22 + 2[x(k+1) − z(k)]TP [z(k) − x0] + ‖x(k+1) − z(k)‖22
= ‖P [z(k) − x0]‖22 + 2β(k)[a(k)∇d(z(k) − x0) + b(k)s(z(k))]TP [z(k) − x0]
+ β(k)2‖a(k)∇d(z(k) − x0) + b(k)s(z(k))‖22
≤ (1− 2β(k)γ)‖P [z(k) − x0]‖22 + β(k)2B2
(46)
The second equality is from Eq. (6). The last line is from assumption 5 and Eq. (33).
Next, combining Eqs. (45) and (46), we have
‖x(k+1) − P [x(k+1)]‖22 ≤
(
1 +
2αnLsκβ
(k)
m
)2
(1− 2β(k)γ)‖x(k) − P [x(k)]‖22 + β(k)2D
≤ (1− 2β(k)F )‖x(k) − P [x(k)]‖22 + β(k)2D
(47)
where
D = E +B2
E =
8α
√
nLsκ
2
δm2r
(0)2
1
F = γ − 2αnLsκ
m
> 0 (Assumption 7)
(48)
According to assumption 8, limk→∞ β(k) = 0. Thus, ∀ > 0, ∃K(), ∀k > K(), we have β(k) ≤ 2γε/D. Therefore
‖x(k+1) − P [x(k+1)]‖22 −  ≤ (1− 2Fβ(k))(‖x(k) − P [x(k)]‖22 − ) (49)
Finally, notice that by assumption 8
lim
K→∞
K∏
k=1
(1− 2β(k)F ) = 0 (50)
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then
lim
k→∞
‖x(k) − P [x(k)]‖22 ≤  (51)
which holds ∀ > 0. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 1.4. Given all the assumptions in Thm. 1, where Mα and mk defined in Eqs. (21) and (22), and
Mβ = min
1,
√
C(1−A)
B
,
2FX
D
,
1
2F
,
√
X − r(0)21 ‖P [x(0) − x0]‖22
E
,
X
r
(0)2
1 D/2F + E
 (52)
where A, B, D and E are defined in Eqs. (34) and (48), the following inequalities hold ∀k.
|c(x(k))| ≤ C
|c(z(k))| ≤ C
‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 ≤ X
‖P [z(k) − x0]‖22 ≤ X
(53)
i.e. x(k), z(k) ∈ B,∀k.
Proof. We will prove it by mathematical induction.
Base Case: From assumption 9, we have |c(x(0))| ≤ C and ‖P [x(0) − x0]‖22 ≤ X . Thus Eqs. (26) and (45) hold
for k = 0. From Eq. (26) and assumption 7, we have |c(z(0))| ≤ |c(x(0))| ≤ C. From Eqs. (45) and (52), we have
‖P [z(0) − x0]‖22 ≤ X .
Step Case: Assume Eq. (53) holds ∀k ≤ K, then Eqs. (33) and (47) holds ∀k ≤ K.
• Proving |c(x(K+1))| ≤ C:
From Eq. (33),
|c(x(K+1))| − β
(K)2B
1−A ≤ A
(
|c(x(K))| − β
(K)2B
1−A
)
(54)
If
|c(x(K))| ≤ β
(K)2B
1−A
Then
|c(x(K+1))| ≤ β
(K)2B
1−A ≤
β(0)2B
1−A ≤ C (55)
where the last inequality is given by Eq. (52).
Otherwise
|c(x(K+1))| ≤ |c(x(K))| ≤ C (56)
• Proving ‖P [x(K+1) − x0]‖22 ≤ X:
From Eq. (47)
‖P [x(K+1) − x0]‖22 −
β(K)D
2F
≤ (1− 2β(K)F )
(
‖P [x(K) − x0]‖22 −
β(K)D
2F
)
(57)
Notice that from Eq. (52), 0 ≤ (1− 2β(0)F ) ≤ (1− 2β(K)F ) < 1.
If
‖P [x(K) − x0]‖22 ≤
β(K)D
2F
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Then
‖P [x(K+1) − x0]‖22 ≤
β(K)D
2F
≤ β
(0)D
2F
≤ X (58)
where the last inequality is given by Eq. (52).
Otherwise
‖P [x(K+1) − x0]‖22 ≤ ‖P [x(K) − x0]‖22 ≤ X (59)
• Proving |c(z(K+1))| ≤ C:
Since we have established |c(x(K+1))| ≤ C, Eq. 26 holds for k = K + 1. Therefore
|c(z(K+1))| = A|c(x(K+1))| ≤ |c(x(K+1))| ≤ C (60)
• Proving ‖P [z(K+1) − x0]‖22 ≤ X:
Since we have established ‖P [x(K+1) − x0]‖22 ≤ X , Eq. (45) holds for k = K + 1.
From Eqs. (58) and (59), we can establish, through recursion, that
‖P [x(k) − x0]‖22 ≤ max
{
β(0)D
2F
, ‖P [x(0) − x0]‖22
}
,∀k ≤ K + 1 (61)
Therefore,
‖P [z(K+1) − x0]‖22 ≤ r(K+1)21 ‖P [x(K+1) − x0]‖22 + β(K+1)2E
≤ r(K+1)21 max
{
β(0)D
2F
, ‖P [x(0) − x0]‖22
}
+ β(K+1)2E
≤ r(0)21 max
{
β(0)D
2F
, ‖P [x(0) − x0]‖22
}
+ β(0)2E
≤ X
(62)
The first line is given by Eq. (45). The last line is given by Eq. (52).
Lemma 1.5. Under the assumptions in Thm. 1
P [x∗ − x0] = 0 (63)
Proof. From Thm. 2, a solution, denoted as x′, to
min
x
d(x− x0)
s.t.∇T c(x∗)(x− x∗) = 0
(64)
would satisfy
P [x′ − x0] = 0 (65)
If P [x∗ − x0] 6= 0, there are two possibilities. The first possibility is that x∗ is not a solution to Eq. (64), which contradicts
with the first order optimality condition that x∗ must satisfy.
The second possibility is there are multiple solutions to the problem in Eq. (64), and x′ and x∗ are both its solutions. This
can happen if d(·) is `1 or `∞ norm. By definition
∇T c(x∗)(x′ − x∗) = 0 (66)
Since x∗ is a local minimum to Eq. (1), ∃j ∈ I, ε < 1, ∀δ < ε, xδ = δx∗ + (1− δ)x′, s.t.
c(xδ) > 0, xδ ∈ Bj (67)
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Otherwise, if c(xδ) ≤ 0, then xδ is a feasible solution to the problem in Eq. (1) and
d(xδ − x0) ≤ δd(x∗ − x0) + (1− δ)d(x′ − x0) = d(x∗ − x0) (68)
which contradicts with the assumption that x∗ is a unique local optimum in B.
Eq. (67) implies
∇Tj c(xδ)(xδ − x∗) = (1− δ)∇Tj c(xδ)(x′ − x∗) > 0 (69)
On the other hand, notice that Eq. (65) implies s(x∗) = λ(x0 − x′), λ > 0. For `1/`∞ cases, sj(x) takes discrete values.
Therefore, to satisfy assumption 2, sj(xδ) = sj(x∗), which implies
0 = d(x∗)− d(x∗) ≥ −
λj∇T cj(xδ) + ∑
i∈I,i6=j
λi∇T ci(x∗)
 (x∗ − x′), λi > 0, i ∈ I (70)
The first inequality is because −
[
λj∇T cj(xδ) +
∑
i∈I,i6=j λi∇T ci(x∗)
]
∈ ∇Ts d(x′ − x0).
Eqs. (69) and (70) cause a contradiction.
Now we are ready to prove Thm. 1.
Proof of Thm. 1. From Lems. 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4, we can established that Eqs. (23) and (39) holds under all the assumptions in
Thm. 1. The only thing we need to prove is that Eqs. (23) and (39) necessarily implies limk→‖x(k) − x0‖2 = 0.
First, from Lem. 1.5
‖P [x∗ − x0]‖2 = 0 (71)
Then, ∀x′ ∈ B s.t. ‖P [x′ − x0]‖22 = 0, we have x′ − x = λs(x′). From assumption 4, we know that c(x′) is monotonic
along x′ − x = λs(x′). Therefore, x∗ is the only point in B that satisfies ‖P [x′ − x0]‖22 = 0 and c(x′) = 0.
Also, notice that P [x− x0] and c(x) are both continuous mappings. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 2. The solution to
argmin
x
d(x)
s.t. ∇T c(x′)x = b
(72)
is
x =
bs(x′)
∇T c(x′)s(x′) (73)
Proof. Decompose x = λy, where d(y) = 1. Then Eq. (72) can be rewritten as
argmin
λ,y:d(y)=1
λ
s.t. λ∇T c(x′)y = b
(74)
Notice that the product of λ and ∇T c(x′)y is constant, so if λ is to be minimized, then ∇T c(x′)y needs to be maximized.
Namely, y can be determined by solving
max
y:d(y)=1
∇T c(x′)y (75)
which is the definition of dual norm. Therefore
y = s(x′) (76)
Plug Eq. (76) into the constraint in Eq. (74), we can solve for λ. This concludes the proof.
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Table 5. Hyperparameter settings for MARGINATTACK.
Hyper- `2 `∞
parameters MNIST CIFAR IMAGENET MNIST CIFAR0 IMAGENET
a(k) Eq. (8) Eq. (8) Eq. (8) 0.1 1 0.3
b(k) 1 1 1 Eq. (10) Eq. (10) Eq. (10)
α 1 1 1 0.2 0.2 0.2
β(k) (k + 1)−0.5 (k + 1)−0.5 (k + 1)−0.5 (k + 1)−1 (k + 1)−1 (k + 1)−1
u 0.05 0.1 0 0.05 0.1 0
ε -0.01
As a remark, Thm. 2 is applicable to the optimization problems in Eqs. (3) and (64) by changing the variable x˜ = x− x0
and redefining b accordingly.
Theorem 3. For `2 norm, if all the assumptions in Thm. 1, but assumption 5, hold, and
∃ma > 0, s.t. a(k) ≥ ma (77)
also assuming c(x) is convex in B, then ∃B′ = {x : ‖P [x− x∗]‖22 ≤ X ′, |c(x)| ≤ C ′} ⊂ B, s.t. assumption 5 hold.
Proof. Since c(x) is convex in B, we have ∀x
(∇T c(x)−∇T c(x∗))(x− x∗) ≥ 0 (78)
Further, assume x satisfies
∇T c(x∗)(x− x∗) = 0 (79)
Then we have
P TP (x− x∗) = P (x− x∗) = x− x∗ (80)
where the first equality is from the fact that P is an orthogonal projection matrix under `2 norm; the second equality is from
the fact that the projection subspace of P is orthogonal to ∇c(x∗) by construction.
Also, from Lem. 1.5, we have
P (x− x∗) = P (x− x0) (81)
Plug Eqs. (79) to (81) into (78), we have
∇T c(x)P TP (x− x∗) ≥ 0 (82)
On the other hand, let γ = ma/2‖x∗ − x0‖2, then ∀x satisfying Eq. (79) and x 6= x∗
a(k)∇T d(x− x0)P TP (x− x0) = a
(k)
‖x− x0‖2 (x− x0)
TP TP (x− x0)
≥ ma‖x∗ − x0‖2 (x− x0)
TP TP (x− x0)
> γ(x− x0)TP TP (x− x0)
(83)
where the second line comes from Eq. (77) and the fact that x∗ is the optimal solution to the problem in Eq. (64). Combining
Eqs. (82) and (83), we know that assumption 5 holds with strict inequality for x satisfying Eq. (79) and x 6= x∗.
∇T c(x)P TP (x−x∗),∇T d(x−x0)P TP (x−x0) and γ(x−x0)TP TP (x−x0) are continuous functions, and therefore
∃B′ where assumption 5 also holds. This concludes the proof.
B. Hyperparameter Settings for MARGINATTACK
Table 5 list the hyperparameter settings for MARGINATTACK.
